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ABSTRACT 
Previous research has demonstrated that consistency between people’s behavior and their 
dispositions has predictive validity for judgments of regret. Research has also shown that 
differences in the personality variable of action orientation can influence ability to regulate 
negative affect. The present set of studies was designed to investigate how both consistency 
factors and action-state personality orientation influence judgments of regret. In Study 1, we 
used a recalled life event to provide a situation in which the person had experienced either an 
action or inaction. Individuals with an action orientation experienced more regret for situations 
involving inaction (staying home) than situations involving action (going out). State-oriented 
individuals, however, maintained high levels of regret and did not differ in their regret ratings 
across either the action or inaction situations. In Study 2, participants made realistic choices 
involving either an action or inaction. Our findings revealed the same pattern of results: action-
oriented individuals who chose an option that involved not acting (inaction) had more regret that 
individuals who chose an option that involved acting (action). State-oriented individuals 
experienced high levels of regret regardless of whether they chose to act or not to act. 
  
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Unquestionably, we all feel regret at times; whether we 
missed a great opportunity or failed to make the right 
decisions when pressed under the weight of burdening 
stress. This somber feeling of loss can accompany our 
actions (or lack thereof) and be a powerful force for both 
our emotional and behavioral responses. Efforts at understanding 
the experiences underlying these feelings of 
regret have led to different avenues of research. Much 
of the contemporary work charged with understand regret 
has spotlighted attention on how imaginary outcomes 
or “counterfactuals” influence a person’s feeling of regret 
(e.g., Bell, 1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982; Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986). Although this certainly makes up a fascinating 
facet of the regret process, the “focused attention” 
of research has lead most researchers to relinquish pursuit 
of other pre-decisional factors that come into play in 
the regret process. 
 
Recently, however, a good deal of research has begun 
to examine this aspect of the processes involved in regret. 
Specifically, research has demonstrated that consistency 
factors between people and their behavior also 
play an important role in understanding the regret process 
(e.g., Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Pieters & Zeelenberg, 
2005; Seta, McElroy & Seta, 2001). One as- 
pect of the consistency-regret relationship that remains 
largely uninvestigated is how individual difference factors 
influence reliance on consistency information. In this 
paper we focus on how the individual difference factor of 
action-state orientation affects responsiveness to decision 
factors (action vs. inaction) as well as the ability to regulate 
bad outcome information in a regretful situation. 
 
 
1.1 Consistency view 
 
Paramount explanations of human behavior suggest that 
motivation caused by the drive to maintain cognitive consistency 
will lead people to change their attitudes, beliefs, 
and behaviors in order to best achieve or maintain a state 
of internal consistency. One of the earliest views derived 
from this perspective was developed by Heider (1946) 
who proposed balance theory as a way of understanding 
human behavior. According to Heider, stability is the desired 
state that we hope to maintain. However, when elements 
are perceived as psychologically inconsistent, they 
are unstable. And this instability of psychological elements 
acts to motivate an individual to seek out a way to 
obtain or reestablish a state of stability. 
One type of consistency comparison focuses on how 
alternatives are contrasted before a decision is reached. 
Work by Janis and Mann (1968; 1977) lead to the development 
of conflict theory, which suggests that individual 
decision makers compare alternatives they are facing. 
According to this approach, decision makers will 
be motivated by the tension of making a bad decision 
and consequently bolster their opinion of an option before 
the choice is made. This allows decision makers 
to escape from the tension of making a bad decision before 
becoming committed to an option. Work by Svenson 
(1996) also focused on predecisional comparison and described 
this processing as a series of back and forth comparisons 
between alternatives that is terminated when one 
alternative is perceived as superior. More recent work 
has advanced the understanding of predecisional consistency 
principles, demonstrating how they are an effective 
means for understanding decisions in a complex environment 
that often consists of ambiguous information 
(Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon & Holyoak, 2002). 
 
Introduction of this consistency factor also led to the 
theoretical advancement that inconsistency can lead to a 
negative state of arousal, or cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957), which in turn motivates people to take the 
appropriate steps necessary to alleviate this dissonance. 
Further examination of the role that consistency factors 
can play has led to great strides in understanding human 
behavior (e.g., Aronson, 1969; Brehm & Cohen, 1962; 
Festinger, 1957; Markus & Zajonc, 1985). 
 
Recently, some researchers have begun to investigate 
how consistency factors may influence feelings of regret. 
One approach deals with how regret can arise as a function 
of consistency/inconsistency between a person’s orientation 
and action/inaction of an evaluative choice. In a 
series of studies, Seta, McElroy and Seta (2001) demonstrated 
that, when the decision maker adopts an orientation 
of acting (e.g., risk-taker) errors associated with actions 
are more consistent and lead to relatively less feelings 
of regret. On the other hand, errors associated with 
inactions are more inconsistent with the action orientation 
and lead to comparatively greater feelings of regret. 
Conversely, when a decision maker assumes an inactive 
orientation (e.g., risk-avoider) errors involving inactions 
are consistent and lead to relatively less regret as compared 
to errors involving actions. 
 
Work by Camacho, Higgins & Luger (2003) investigated 
a similar consistency dependent framework. Camacho 
et al., focused their investigation on how value 
from fit with self regulatory focus and the task at hand 
influences feelings of morality. Across four studies, they 
observed how omission and commission corresponded to 
an individual’s orientation towards either promotion or 
prevention. They found that when there was a “consistency” 
or a regulatory fit (commission corresponded to 
promotion focus and omission corresponded to prevention 
focus) guilt for past transgressions was relatively 
less, however, there was relatively greater guilt for past 
transgressions when a violation of fit or “inconsistency” 
between commission/omission and promotion/prevention 
occurred. 
 
Recently, Connolly and Zeelenberg (2002) have proposed 
Decision Justification Theory (DJT) as a means 
for better understanding the regret process. According to 
DJT, feelings of regret stem from a combination of outcome 
evaluation as well as the feeling of having made a 
poor choice. Inherent within this view is the comparison 
process that occurs between the outcome and some standard. 
According to this view, outcomes that are unjustified 
or inconsistent with a standard will generate more 
regret without respect to whether the outcome itself was 
good or bad. Further extending this view, Pieters and Zeelenberg 
(2005) demonstrated that inconsistency between 
the outcome and some standard (intention-behavior inconsistency) 
is a determining factor for regret and that 
it seems to be specific to regret rather than other similar 
emotions. Further, they show that regret emanating from 
this inconsistency can be reduced if sufficient justification 
occurs. 
 
Although this research strongly supports the view that 
consistency plays an important role in determining an individual’s 
level of regret over a decision, an aspect that 
remains largely uninvestigated is how individual differences 
may influence feelings of regret via perceived inconsistency. 
Specifically, are there individual differences 
in the way that individuals regulate their regret responses 
in relation to consistency information? Further, could it 
be that individual personality characteristics can predispose 
decision-makers to experience more or less regret 
as function of the consistency between their personality 
and whether a bad outcome involved an action or inaction? 
One personality trait that seems particularly adept 
for providing some insight into these questions is the predisposition 
towards either an action or state orientation. 
 
 
 
 
1.2 PSI theory 
 
According to personality systems interactions theory 
(PSI), individuals are prone toward either an action or 
state orientation and this orientation is a stable personality 
characteristic for all persons (Kuhl, 2000) and appears 
to be reflected at very basic levels of processing (Koole 
& Coenen, 2007). According to work by Kuhl and colleagues 
(e.g., Baumann & Kuhl, 2002; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl 
& Kazen, 1994), an action orientation predisposes people 
toward taking action to solve problems, spend relatively 
more cognitive resources on a given task and they 
are relatively better at focusing their attention to achieve 
success with a desired goal. Thus, they are more likely to 
outperform state-oriented individuals on person and goal 
centered tasks. State-oriented individuals, on the other 
hand, tend to dwell upon negative aspects of an event and 
have difficulty controlling negative affect. This aspect 
of their orientation diminishes their cognitive resources 
and impedes their ability to complete tasks and make 
choices. Consequently, state-oriented individuals are relatively 
less effective at dealing with situations that incur 
negativity. Action-oriented individuals, however, are better 
able to overcome negative experiences, thus allowing 
them to regulate negative affect more effectively. 
 
For example, research by Heckhausen and Strang 
(1988) found that basketball players who maintained a 
state orientation had both an increase in physiological 
stress and a decrease in athletic performance when performing 
under pressure whereas action-oriented players 
experienced neither physiological stress nor performance 
decrements when playing under similar levels of stress. 
Research has also shown that, when experiencing failure, 
state-oriented individuals show decreased performance 
on some cognitive tasks (Kuhl, 1981) and report more unpleasant 
feelings Brunstein & Olbrich, 1985) than actionoriented 
individuals who do not seem to experience these 
effects. 
 
 
1.3 Overview 
 
Prior research involving consistency and regret (e.g., Camacho 
et al., 2003; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Pieters 
& Zeelenberg, 2005; Seta et al., 2001) has found that, 
when actions/inactions are inconsistent with the decision 
maker’s orientation (intention), relatively greater regret is 
felt than when they are consistent. Research in PSI theory 
has demonstrated that state-oriented individuals have 
difficulty regulating negative affect, are chronic worriers 
and are relatively unable to dispense with negative 
states. Action-oriented individuals, on the other hand, 
are better able to use self-regulation for affect regulation 
and are more likely to take actions to relieve a negative 
state. In our investigation we sought to examine how personality 
predispositions toward an action or state orientation 
would influence reported feelings of regret generated 
from a distressful event involving either an action or inaction. 
 
 
1.4 Predictions 
 
Hypothesis 1: One aspect of the action orientation personality 
trait is that action-oriented individuals tend to focus 
primarily on taking actions (i.e., an action-oriented 
disposition) to deal with the negative situations they encounter. 
Therefore, relying upon research investigating 
consistency factors, we predict that action-oriented individuals 
should experience relatively greater regret when 
they engage in a behavior that is inconsistent with their 
orientation (an inaction) and relatively less regret when 
they engage in a behavior that is consistent with their orientation 
(an action). 
 
Hypothesis 2: We make very different predictions for 
state-oriented individuals. Rather than focusing on actions 
that could potentially alleviate their situation, research 
shows that state-oriented individuals focus predominately 
on the negative aspects of the problem itself 
and are unable or perhaps unwilling to deal with the negative 
affect (Kuhl & Kazen, 1994). Thus, it seems likely 
that state-oriented individuals’ predisposition will make 
them more likely to experience high levels of regret and 
less likely to be affected by the action or inaction impetus 
behind their decisions. Therefore, state-oriented individuals 
will perceive high feelings of regret regardless 
of whether they are evaluating a situation that involves an 
action or inaction. 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we conducted two experiments 
and observed how action and state-oriented individuals 
differed in their reported regret ratings of a bad 
event that involved them making a decision to act or not 
to act. In our first study, we conducted an experiment using 
a hypothetical decision-making task that involved a 
choice between either an action (going out) or inaction 
(staying home), and in both cases a distressing event occurred. 
We then measured participants’ reported feelings 
of regret. In our second experiment, we placed participants 
in an experimental setting and had them make real 
decision choices. Their decisions involved either action 
or inaction, both with the same negative outcome. Afterward, 
we asked them to report their feelings of regret 
resulting from their decision. 
 
 
2 EXPERIMENT 1 
 
2.1 METHOD 
 
2.1.1 Participants and Design 
 
One-hundred and twenty one undergraduates participated 
in the study and received credit toward their class requirement 
in psychology. Participants were run in groups containing 
an average of approximately fifteen people. The 
design of our study was a 2 (orientation: action, state) x 
2 (behavior: action, inaction) between-subjects factorial 
design. 
 
2.1.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were first informed that the purpose of the 
study was to investigate their opinions about a situation. 
All participants were presented with the action orientation 
scale, a well-validated measure of action-state 
orientation (Diefendorff, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000; 
Kuhl, 1994). The action-orientation scale consists of 
three subscales, but for the purposes of our study we focused 
only on answers provided to items in the threat- 
related subscale (Diefendorff et al., 2000). The threatrelated 
subscale (shown in the Appendix) consists of 12 
threat-related actions and asks how individuals deal with 
these actions (Kuhl, 1994). These items reflect individual 
action-oriented participant’s ability to detach themselves 
from undesirable events or unobtainable goals, as well as 
state-oriented individual’s inability to deal with undesirable 
experiences and failure. This is associated with their 
rumination upon these unpleasant events, including failure. 
 
Next, we randomly assigned participants to either the 
action or inaction condition and asked them to recall 
a life-event, a method that allows for real life assessment 
instead of relying on purely hypothetical situations 
(Sanna, Turley-Ames & Meier, 1999). Across both action 
and inaction conditions, participants were first asked 
to think about a situation in which they were deciding between 
going out and staying home. Participants in the 
action condition were asked to imagine that they decided 
to go out and then, after going out, they realized that they 
would have had a better time staying at home. Similarly, 
participants in the inaction condition imagined that they 
had decided to stay at home and, after staying at home, 
they realized that they would have had a better time going 
out. 
 
Finally, we asked participant’s to indicate their level 
of regret by asking them the following question (inaction 
condition in parentheses): “Given the above situation, 
how much regret do you feel from going out (not 
going out)?” We used a 101-point scale where 0 was 
none at all and 100 represented very much. Following 
this question about their regret, we wanted to follow-up 
and assess participants’ retrospective impression of the 
recalled life event, specifically, how consistent they felt 
the action or inaction was for them. We believe that this 
should provide a measure of participant’s perceived consistency 
between their orientation and the action/inaction. 
Therefore, we asked all of our participants to rate how 
consistent they felt their action or inaction was at the time 
they made their decision. We again used a 101-point scale 
where 0 indicated very inconsistent and 100 very consistent. 
They were then debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment, thanked, and given course credit for participating 
in the study. 
 
 
2.2 Results 
 
In order to test our hypotheses, we dummy coded the independent 
variable of action/inaction. We then performed 
a regression analysis with participants’ action/state orientation 
scores and behavior (action or inaction) as our 
independent variables and reported regret as our dependent 
variable. This analysis did not reveal any significant 
main effects but did reveal a significant interaction effect 
between action/state orientation and behavior (F (1, 117) 
= 6.1, p < .02). 
 
To further investigate this finding, we performed additional 
analyses to investigate the influence of the action/ 
inaction variable for both state and action-oriented 
participants. As can be seen in Figure 1, the results revealed 
that state-oriented participants demonstrated no 
significant difference in reported regret ratings as a function 
of whether the task involved action or inaction (F (1, 
54) = .03, p > .8). Action-oriented individuals however, 
did show significant differences in regret ratings across 
the conditions (F (1, 63) = 17.82, p < .001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Average regret as a function of action orientation 
(median split at a score of 6) and behavior, Experiment 
1. 
 
 
To resolve whether action or state-oriented individuals 
differed in their perceived consistency of the action/ 
inaction, we chose to explore each group separately. 
When we examined state-oriented individuals, we 
found that their reported consistency ratings did not differ 
across the action/inaction conditions (F (1, 54) = 1.17, p 
> .28). However, when we looked at action-oriented individuals 
we found that their consistency ratings did dif- 
fer across the two conditions (F (1, 63) = 4.14, p < .05). 
As displayed in Table 1, action-oriented participants in 
the action condition who were assigned to “go out” reported 
that their behavior was more consistent as compared 
to the action-oriented individuals in the inaction or 
“stay home” condition. 
 
 
3 EXPERIMENT 2 
 
4 METHOD 
 
4.0.1 Participants and design 
 
One-hundred and seventy-five undergraduate students enrolled 
in introductory psychology classes were recruited 
for this study. Participants received credit that partially 
fulfilled their research course requirement and were 
scheduled in groups containing on average of twelve persons 
per session. The design of our study was the same as 
that of Study 1 and included a 2 (orientation: action vs. 
state) x 2 (behavior: action vs. inaction) between-subjects 
factorial design. 
 
 
4.0.2 Materials 
 
As in Study 1, we gave Kuhl’s (1994) entire actionorientation 
scale. And, again, we used the subscale 
shown in the Appendix to determine the extent to which 
participants maintained a personality predisposition towards 
either an action or state orientation. Completion 
of the scale was followed by a decision task that involved 
either acting or not acting. The decision task we used for 
this study, however, differed significantly from the one 
used in our first study. 
 
The decision-making task that we used was modified 
from a vignette originally developed by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) and has been shown in past studies to 
be a good measure for investigating feelings of regret under 
conditions of real rather than hypothetical decisionmaking 
(Seta et al., 2001, Study 3). An important distinction 
between the current decision task and Tversky and 
Kahneman’s original vignette is that participants are now 
faced with choices that seemed real about the success of a 
hypothetical business. Because they are told that archival 
data from actual case files is being used to judge their 
responses and that they will be compared to other state 
universities they are led to believe that the accuracy of 
their choice will affect not only their own personal score 
but also that of their university as well. 
 
In addition, this decision task allows for the experimenter 
to induce most participants to either keep the 
stock they were initially given (an act of omission) or to 
switch to the stock offered by another company (an act of 
commission). In particular, one option is risky ($6,000 vs. 
$0 outcomes) and the other is “safe” ($2,000). The risky 
option tends to be avoided. It was assigned to the “keep” 
option for half the participants or the “switch” option for 
the other half. This aspect of the decision task resulted in 
a relatively even distribution of action or inaction choices 
across both action and state-oriented participants: in the 
omission condition, 60 participants adhered to the manipulation 
(kept) and 24 did not; in the commission condition, 
58 adhered (switched) and 33 did not. 
 
 
4.0.3 Procedure 
 
Participants were met by an experimenter who described 
the purpose of the study as an investigation to determine 
how students at their university perform on a decisionmaking 
task relative to other students in the state school 
system. They were also told that they would complete 
a decision-making task that involved choosing between 
one of two company stock options and that their task was 
to choose the company stock that would make the most 
profit. Participants were led to believe that the “correct” 
answer was based on archival data from actual case files 
and that the profit of each company would contribute to 
their score. That is, the more the company they chose 
earned, the better their final score. 
 
After being informed about the nature of the study, participants 
were presented with the action-orientation scale 
(Kuhl, 1994). After completion of the scale, they were 
presented with our decision-making task. For this decision 
task, all participants read that they could keep stock 
in Company X or switch to Company Z. If assigned to the 
“omission directed” presentation (design to push participants 
toward omission), participants read that if they keep 
stock in Company X they would make a $2,000 profit. 
Alternatively, if they choose to switch to stock in Company 
Z they would have a one-third probability of making 
a $6,000 profit and a two-thirds probability of making 
no profit. However, if assigned to the “commission directed” 
condition, participants read that if they keep stock 
in Company X they would have a one-third probability 
of making a $6,000 profit and a two-thirds probability of 
making no profit. Otherwise, if they choose to switch to 
stock in Company Z, they would make a $2,000 profit. 
 
After participants made their choice to either act or 
not act, they experienced a brief delay of approximately 
2 minutes to give the illusion that the experimenter was 
scoring their response using the archival data of past case 
files. Participants were then provided with relevant feedback. 
For all participants, this feedback indicated that 
they would have been better off choosing the option that 
they did not select: specifically, if they choose the safe 
option they were told that they would have gotten $6,000 
with the risky option; and if they chose the risky option, 
they were told that they got $0. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Average regret as a function of action orientation 
(median split at score of 6 and behavior for decisionmaking 
choices, Experiment 2. 
 
 
 
After receiving this negative feedback, we told participants 
that (inaction condition in parentheses) “Before we 
go on to the next task we would like you to indicate the 
amount of regret that you feel in having made your decision. 
That is, your decision to switch companies (keep 
the stock you already had) and not keep the stock you 
already had (not to switch companies).” We then asked 
them “How much regret do you have?” at which point 
they were presented with a 101-point scale ranging from 
0 to 100 (in increments of ten) and asked to circle the 
most appropriate value for the level of regret they felt 
about their decision and its resulting feedback. For this 
regret question, a value of 0 indicated no regret and a 
value of 100 indicated very much regret.1 They were then 
thoroughly debriefed about the aims of the experiment, 
thanked, and given course credit for participating in the 
study. 
 
 
4.1 Results and discussion 
 
In our methodology, we provided participants with a decision 
task that allowed them the opportunity to choose 
either the action or inaction response. Similar to Study 1, 
we wanted to test our hypotheses involving how actionvs. 
state-oriented participants experience regret in situations 
involving action or inaction. However, in this study 
we also encouraged participants to choose either action or 
inaction by manipulating the status quo (safe or risky option) 
presented to them. Therefore, we first wanted to test 
whether participants’ adherence to this manipulation — 
that is, their choice of the safe option in both conditions 
— interacted with choice (action, inaction) and orientation 
(action, state). To investigate this, we first dummy 
coded participants’ action/inaction choice and adherence. 
We then performed a regression analysis with level of orientation, 
choice and adherence acting as our independent 
variables and participants’ regret responses as our dependent 
variable. This analysis did not reveal a significant 
interaction (F (1, 167) = 1.86, p > .17), suggesting that 
the interaction of choice (action, inaction) and orientation 
on regret did not depend on adherence. 
To investigate our main hypotheses — that this interaction 
would again be found — we next performed a regression 
analysis as in Study 1 with level of orientation 
(action, state) and choice (action, inaction) acting as our 
independent variables and participants’ regret responses 
as our dependent variable. This analysis revealed a significant 
main effect for action orientation (F (1, 171) = 
14.82, p < .001) as well as the omnibus interaction of action 
orientation x choice (F (1, 171) = 5.9, p < .02). 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, action-oriented individuals 
appear to have relatively more regret when they chose 
not to act than when they choose to act; however, stateoriented 
individuals appear to have high levels of regret 
regardless of their decision choice. In order to investigate 
this observation, we performed further analyses for 
each of the respective state/action orientation conditions. 
These analyses revealed that the regret ratings for stateoriented 
individuals did not differ regardless of whether 
they performed an action or inaction, F (1, 98) = .41, 
p > .5. We then wanted to examine the regret ratings 
of action-oriented individuals as a function of whether 
they performed an action or inaction. This analysis revealed 
that these individuals did differ in their regret ratings 
across the two conditions — F (1, 73) = 39.1, p < 
.001 — expressing more regret when they chose not to 
act (inconsistent condition) than when they chose to act 
(consistent condition). 
 
Further, action-oriented participants who chose not to 
act (inconsistent condition) did not differ in their regret 
ratings from either the state-oriented participants who 
chose to act (F (1, 63) = .1, p > .9) or those who chose 
not to act (F (1, 91) = .4, p > .5). However, actionoriented 
participants who chose to act (consistent condition) 
did have significantly lower levels of reported regret 
than both state-oriented participants who chose not to act 
(F (1, 108) = 24, p < .001) as well as those state-oriented 
participants who chose to act (F (1, 80) = 32, p < .001). 
 
Consistent with our hypotheses and the findings from 
Study 1, we found that, when action-oriented individuals 
made a choice that was consistent with their predispose- 
tion (action), they experienced relatively less regret than 
when they made a choice that was inconsistent with their 
predisposition (inaction). Conversely, because of stateoriented 
individuals’ inability to regulate negative affect, 
they did not differ in their regret ratings, experiencing 
similar levels of regret regardless of whether they chose 
to act or not to act. 
 
 
5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Across both studies we investigated how felt regret emanates 
from the consistency between a person’s own personality 
predisposition and their decision to choose an 
alternative that invokes either an action or relies on inaction. 
In Study 1, we employed the use of the typical 
methodology involving a hypothetical vignette of 
a recalled life event. In Study 2, however, we further 
explored and extended our investigation placing participants 
in a situation where they were presented with a 
choice to make that seemed real to them. They were then 
forced to choose between alternatives that involved either 
an action or inaction. 
 
Our results supported our hypotheses and prior research 
for both hypothetical and realistic situations (e.g., 
Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994; Seta et al., 2001). Stateoriented 
individuals reported relatively high levels of regret 
and did not differ in regret responses regardless of 
whether the situation involved an action or inaction. This 
finding reflects state-oriented individuals’ inability to regulate 
negative emotion. For those individuals predisposed 
toward an action orientation, we found that, when they 
were confronted with a distressful outcome that was consistent 
with their action orientation (they acted), their 
level of regret was markedly low, but when they examined 
a situation where they did not act, this inconsistent 
behavior lead to especially high levels of regret and was 
similar to the level of regret reported by state-oriented individuals. 
These findings further extend the research investigating 
action orientation and PSI theory. Research exploring 
action/state orientation has demonstrated that negative 
mood can have profoundly different effects on actionoriented 
and state-oriented individuals (e.g., Baumann & 
Kuhl, 2002). It has also been found that state-oriented individuals 
are more likely to ascribe a greater number of 
self-related attributions when encountering negative affect 
whereas action-oriented individuals are better able to 
overcome this tendency (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003). Consistent 
with this research, we found that state-oriented individuals 
had difficulty overcoming the regretful feelings 
of a negative outcome for both action and inaction situations 
suggesting that they were unable to regulate the 
tendency to place blame on their self. However, actionoriented 
individuals were able to overcome regretful feelings 
as long as their behavior was consistent with their 
action orientation. 
 
Past research investigating the consistency between an 
individual’s orientation and behavior has demonstrated 
that inconsistencies between the two lead to relatively 
greater feelings of regret than consistencies (e.g., Camacho 
et al., 2003; Connolly & Zeelenberg, 2002; Pieters 
& Zeelenberg, 2005; Seta et al., 2001). The current research 
provides further evidence for the significance of 
the consistency factor and highlights the importance that 
individuals often place on the consistency between their 
orientation and subsequent behavior. This finding also 
extends earlier work involving consistency and regret by 
providing evidence that the action/state personality predisposition 
can act as a relevant factor for consistencybased 
behavioral comparison. 
 
These results also allow for a contrast to be made between 
scenario situations and decisions that participants 
thought were real. This is especially important for research 
concerning regret because there is a great deal 
of reliance on scenario situations. While some research 
has included real decisions with real implications (e.g., 
Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Seta et al., 2001) most of the 
present research relies exclusively upon hypothetical vignettes 
provided to participants. These studies provide 
empirical evidence that, at least in our situations, there is 
consistency among both hypothetical and real-appearing 
decision paradigms. 
 
In a related series of studies, Svenson, Salo and van 
de Loo (2007) investigated how state and action-oriented 
individuals may differ in their reactions and recall of reallife 
situations. They found that, when asked to recall 
memories of prior decision making events, state-oriented 
participants reported activity level ratings very similar to 
action-oriented individuals. This may be related to our 
current set of findings, such that state-oriented participants 
may have felt that thinking about decision alternatives 
is an activity just as action is perceived as an activity 
in our current studies. Also, Svenson et al., found evidence 
that state-oriented individuals may be more passive 
than action-oriented individuals. Their greater passivity 
may be yet another potential reason for their relative insensitivity 
to the action/inaction of the event. 
 
Convergence with Decision Justification Theory. A 
Juxtaposition of our findings with the theoretical ideas 
put forth from DJT yields some interesting speculation 
for future research. Recall that according to DJT regret is 
a product of two sources. One source results from selfblame 
for a poor outcome whereas the other source arises 
from an outcome comparison and how it was poor relative 
to a set standard. Although speculative, it seems reasonable 
to suggest that action and state-oriented individuals 
may be focusing on different sources for their regret judg- 
ments and that these different sources may correspond to 
those outlined in DJT. Specifically, it could be the case 
that state-oriented individuals focus more on self-blame 
for a bad outcome (a factor not so easy to justify) whereas 
action-oriented individuals may be focusing more on badoutcome 
regret which they are sometimes able to justify 
through consistency. This comparison is indeed speculative 
but has potential for future research seeking to better 
understand regret processes. 
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APPENDIX: THREAT-RELATED ACTIONORIENTATION 
SUBSCALE 
 
1. When I have lost something very valuable to me and 
I can’t find it anywhere: 
(a) I have a hard time concentrating on something 
else. 
(b) I put it out of my mind after a little while. 
 
2. If I’ve worked for weeks on one project and then 
everything goes completely wrong with the project: 
(a) It takes me a long time to adjust myself to it. 
(b) It bothers me for a while, but then I don’t think 
about it anymore. 
 
3. When I am in competition and have lost every time: 
(a) I can soon put losing out of my mind. 
(b) The thought that I lost keeps running through 
my mind. 
 
4. If I had just bought a new piece of equipment (for 
example, a tape deck) and it accidentally fell on the 
floor and was damaged beyond repair: 
(a) I would manage to get over it quickly. 
(b) It would take me a long time to get over it. 
 
5. If I have to talk to someone about something important 
and, repeatedly, can’t find her/him at home: 
(a) I can’t stop thinking about it, even while I’m 
doing something else. 
(b) I easily forget about it until I can see the person 
again. 
 
6. When I have bought a lot of stuff at a store and realize 
when I get home that I paid too much - but can’t 
get my money back: 
(a) I can’t concentrate on anything else. 
(b) I easily forget about it. 
 
7. When I am told that my work has been completely 
unsatisfactory: 
(a) I don’t let it bother me for too long. 
(b) I feel paralysed. 
8. If I am stuck in traffic and miss an important appointment: 
(a) At first, it’s difficult for me to start doing anything 
else at all. 
(b) I quickly forget about it and do something else. 
 
 
 
 
9. When something is very important to me, but I can’t 
seem to get it right: 
(a) I gradually lose heart. 
(b) I just forget about it and go do something else. 
 
10. When something really gets me down: 
(a) I have trouble doing anything at all. 
(b) I find it easy to distract myself by doing other 
things. 
 
11. When several things go wrong on the same day: 
(a) I usually don’t know how to deal with it. 
(b) I just keep on going as though nothing had happened. 
 
12. When I have to put all my effort into doing a really 
good job on something and the whole thing doesn’t 
work out: 
(a) I don’t have too much difficulty starting something 
else. 
(b) I have trouble doing anything else at all. 
